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Abstract The high availability of geolocation technologies is changing
the social media mobile scenario and is exposing users to privacy risks. Dif-
ferent studies have focused on location privacy in the mobile scenario, but
the results are conflicting: some say that users are concerned about loca-
tion privacy, others say they are not. In this paper, we initially investigate
attitudes and behaviors of people toward a location-aware scenario; then,
we show users the amount of personal and sensitive data that can be ex-
tracted from contents publicly available in social platforms, and finally we
ask for their opinions about a location-aware scenario. Results show that
people who were not initially concerned about privacy are the most wor-
ried about the location-aware scenario; conversely, people who were initially
concerned are less worried about the location-aware scenario and find the
scenario interesting. A deeper analysis of the obtained results allows us to
draw guidelines that might be helpful to build an effective location-aware
scenario.
1 Introduction
Knowledge of user location plays an important role in society and is likely to
be of critical importance in future social-based applications. Many advanced
information systems may use geolocation technologies to identify user lo-
cation in order to provide customized services by delivering localized news,
recommending friends, serving targeted ads, improving large scale systems
(e.g., cloud computing, content-based delivery networks). The possibilities
are so broad that location-aware social applications are likely to be impor-
tant for the next generation mobile computing [1]. Indeed, novel location-
aware social applications may be employed in many different scenarios like
urban planning, human mobility, health monitoring, security, advertising,
emergency and altruistic services [2–10]. For instance, after an incident, law
enforcement agencies may spend many person-months to find images shot
near a specific address in order to find a suspect or other evidence [9]. The
knowledge of who were in the area or the automatic gathering of pictures
taken by people in the area would be of great help. Similarly, in a crisis
scene, such as a street accident or a terrorist attack, rescue teams may take
hours to reach the area and organize the necessary operations and therefore
it would be useful to provide first responders with real-time pictures/videos
of the emergency while still driving toward the crisis area [2]. In this case,
the knowledge of who is in the area may give access to real-time hazards,
disaster information, photos and video that would likely speed-up the rescue
operations.
In this social media mobile scenario, user’s geographical location can
be generated either by users (through voluntary check-in in applications
like Foursquare and Facebook Places) or by applications (through technolo-
gies like IP address geolocation, cellphone network triangulation, RFID and
GPS). Regardless of the used approach, the result is that the produced con-
tent is coupled with the geographical location where the user produced it.
Moreover, in addition to geolocation information, many applications attach
to users’ contents a lot of other information like OS language, device type
and capture time. As a result, by tweeting, posting or taking pictures, users
produce and share a vast amount of personal information.
Users consider the social media mobile scenario exciting, but it is worth
mentioning that most of the information attached to the contents (i.e., meta-
data) can be considered personal and sensitive. Indeed, third parties may
combine location data with other information to trace, in real-time, the
movement of a single user. Similarly, criminals may be facilitated in their
activities (from burglary and theft, to stalking, kidnapping and domestic vi-
olence) as geolocation data may reveal personal information such as home,
work and school address [11]. Therefore, users should be aware of possible
privacy and security risks when using location-aware social applications [12].
In the literature, there has been a significant amount of research on lo-
cation privacy, but results are not always clear and consistent. For instance,
if on the one side Kelly et al. [13] showed that users’ strong privacy concerns
may hinder the adoption of systems leveraging this potentially to third par-
ties, on the other side Chin et al. [14] showed that most people are willing
to share their location when using mobile applications. Conflicting results
are likely due to the infancy stage of the location-aware scenario but, in
our opinion, another important reason is the small number of users in the
analyzed sample (e.g., 16 participants in [12], 27 participants in [13], 60
participants in [14], 18 participants in [15]), which may affect the obtained
results.
Our hypothesis is that, due to the infancy stage of the location-aware
scenario, people ignore many of its features and this lack of knowledge may
influence the location-privacy investigation. For this reason, in this paper,
we use a different approach to understand attitudes, behaviors and opinions
of users toward the novel location-aware scenario. We split the investigation
into two phases: the first phase aims at understanding what people know
or ignore of a location-aware scenario; the second phase investigates users’
opinions after showing them a simple location-aware application able to
extract personal and sensitive data from users’ contents publicly available
in social media platforms and able to use these data to locate, in real-
time, these users on a map and to show the obtained personal and sensitive
information. By splitting the investigation into two phases, the analysis will
highlight not only attitudes, behaviors and opinions of users, but will also
reveal if there is a relation between what people know about the location-
aware scenario and what people really think about privacy.
Results obtained from the first phase show that people are not con-
cerned about privacy, but, in the second phase, these people are the most
worried about the location-aware scenario; conversely, people who were ini-
tially concerned, are less worried about the location-aware scenario and find
the scenario interesting. Results also show that men are more willing than
women to enter the location-aware scenario, but both require to give autho-
rization and to receive benefits when third parties access to their contents.
Other interesting findings are that users do not want to be bothered with
marketing or advertising services, that photos are considered private re-
sources to be protected from third parties access, and that women are very
alarmed if third parties would access to their photos.
The obtained results are used to outline possible guidelines for both
users and developers/enterprises that we think might be helpful to develop
an effective location-aware scenario.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
related works in the area of location-aware applications; Section 3 inves-
tigates users’ attitudes and behaviors toward location privacy; Section 4
shows details of the application developed to create a location-aware sce-
nario and Section 5 investigates opinions and preferences with respect to
this scenario. In Section 6 we propose some guidelines for the development
of an effective location-aware scenario. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Related Work
In the mobile scenario, geolocation technologies are increasingly exploited by
novel services and applications. Many different location-aware applications
are available for download in the various app-stores and users are excited
about customized services. For instance, Foursquare and Facebook Places,
two well-known location-aware applications, combine the social aspect with
geolocation data in order to encourage users to “check-in” their current
position from a list of venues the application locates nearby to let friends
know where they are. As a result, by using these applications, one can easily
see if any of his/her friends have checked-in in the nearby.
In addition to applications available in the various app-stores, other
examples of location-aware applications include the ones developed by re-
searchers to study specific topics. For instance, Cho et al. [5] studied the
relation among human geographic movement, its temporal dynamics, and
the ties of the social network. In particular, they analyzed the role of geog-
raphy and daily routine on human mobility patterns and the effect of social
ties. The motivation of the study was to seek and identify the fundamental
factors that govern human mobility. Bicocchi et al. [16] developed a mobile
application that continuously collects and stores user’s location in order to
automatically write a whereabouts diary.
Within the location-aware scenario, applications where users voluntarily
check-in are only a portion. Indeed, many other applications collect geolo-
cation information without asking users to check-in to specific places. These
data are critical and fundamental for some applications (e.g., maps services),
but are not necessary to some others (e.g., music services). For instance, in
Twitter, geolocation information are not critical for the service, nor they are
critical for the service offered by Instagram or Shazam1. Why users should
grant these applications the access to their personal geolocation data? Do
users know that they are sharing personal sensitive data while using geolo-
cation technologies?
Different studies focused on the privacy issue related to disclosing per-
sonal geolocation to third-party applications and results do not completely
clarify the scenario. Jedrzejczyk et al. [17] highlighted that users are not
very good at privacy settings and they usually accept the default options;
things are a little bit different if they understand the future implications of
their choices. Therefore, they propose to use ad-hoc warnings on the user’s
mobile display to aware users. A subsequent study by Fisher et al. [18]
highlighted that users reflexively click ”OK” on warning messages and that
some applications are more trusted than others. In particular, with respect
to geolocation data, users are willing to disclose personal data when these
information are critical for the application: 97% of the interviewed disclosed
their geolocation data to geomap applications, while the percentage dropped
to 53% when music applications asked for location data.
Kelly et al. [13] presented an empirical investigation of people attitudes
towards sharing of personal geolocation with mobile advertisers. In par-
ticular, they showed that users’ strong privacy concerns might hinder the
adoption of systems leveraging this potentially invasive form of advertis-
ing. However, their study also found that advanced privacy settings may
help alleviating some of these concerns and their findings suggest that if
future systems will have usable privacy settings, then all entities involved
will receive benefits from the sharing of personal information.
1 A music identification service available through a mobile app.
Chin et al. [14] highlighted that the type of applications plays a critical
role in users’ experiences with their smartphones and they found that users
are more concerned about privacy when using smartphones than laptops.
Through structured interviews, the study showed how users are reluctant
to enter very sensitive personal information like social security number or
bank account information, but feel free to share personal information like
photos and geolocation data.
Madden et al [19] focused on privacy and teens in the social media sce-
nario. Their results show that teens are sharing more personal information
on their profiles than in the past and most of them are not very concerned
about third parties accessing to their data. With respect to the sharing of
personal location, 16% of teen social media users have set up their profile
to automatically include their location in posts.
The above studies highlighted that the location-aware scenario is subject
to different findings. In this paper, we aim at clarifying some aspects of this
novel scenario. For instance, do users know that some of the applications
they use collect geolocation data? What do users think about location-
aware services? Do users change their opinion when they find out that third
parties may access to users’ personal and sensitive data by simply accessing
to contents publicly available in social media platforms?
3 Users’ attitudes toward privacy in location-based applications
In order to build an effective location-aware scenario, it is necessary to
understand users’ attitudes toward privacy. Unfortunately, as shown in the
previous section, some studies say users are concerned about privacy, while
other studies say they are not. In our opinion, these conflicting results are
mainly due to: i) the infancy stage of the location-aware scenario, and ii)
the small number of users in the sample (e.g., 16 participants in [12], 27
participants in [13], 60 participants in [14], 18 participants in [15]). Needless
to say, this lack of clarity may represent a burden for the success of location-
based applications.
Through a real-world study, we aim at understanding what people think
about novel services and applications based on geolocation technologies.
In particular, we are interested in attitudes and behaviors of people who
daily use technological devices and mobile applications, who consider mobile
devices and applications as commodities and not as technological pieces of
hardware to be scared of. Indeed, these people are usually considered early
adopters of new technologies and services, and therefore, by focusing on
them and by investigating their current attitudes and behaviors, we likely
have insights of what will happen in the future location-aware scenario. To
get in touch with these people, we asked for voluntary participants through
different technological platforms (social networks, emails and forums) and
we did not specify any age limit.
We have been contacted by 122 people (2 to 6 times the number of
participants to other studies in the field) and Figure 1 reports the charac-
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Fig. 1 Characteristics of the subjects who voluntarily participated to our real-
world study: sex (left) and age (right).
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Fig. 2 Smarthphone penetration: men (left) and women (right).
teristics of the 122 participants: 54% are women and 46% are men. Two
percent of the respondents are younger than 18 year-old, 48% are between
19 and 25, 31% are between 26 and 30 and 19% are older than 30 year-old.
Results show a first interesting finding: the majority of people who daily
use technological devices and mobile applications are 19-30 years old.
In the following, we present results obtained while investigating techno-
logical equipment and individual habits, and the relationship between users
and location-aware applications like Twitter and Instagram.
3.1 Technological equipment and habits
One of the goals of the questionnaire was to understand the technological
equipment (smartphone penetration, availability of GPS technology) and
the users’ habits in the mobile scenario (data subscription plan, download
of mobile applications and usage of geolocation services).
Figure 2 (left) reports the type of cellphone owned by respondents:
smartphone or featurephone. Results show that smartphone penetration
is very high: 91% among men and 74% among women. We investigated
whether these smart devices are connected to the Internet or not: 92% of
respondents said their device is always connected through flat rate data
plans. Therefore, access to the Internet through smartphone devices is very
common among respondents.
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Fig. 3 GPS availiability within smarthphone owners: men (left) and women
(right).
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Fig. 4 Use of location-aware mobile applications: men (left) and women (right).
Figure 3 reports the presence of GPS technology in smartphone devices
owned by participants: 83% of men and 64% of women claim to have GPS
technology over their smartphones. Looking at the people who keep the
GPS active, we can observe a different behavior between men and women:
61% of men keep the GPS on, but the percentage decreases to 37% when
analyzing women. Another interesting difference is that 15% of men and
29% of women have no idea about GPS availability.
Figure 4 reports the use of location-aware mobile applications among
respondents. Men seem to be more familiar with these applications (67%
vs. 51%), but it is worth noting that the percentage of people who have no
idea about location-aware applications is higher among women (21%) than
among men (9%).
To better understand the behavior of the respondents with respect to
the use of location-aware applications, Figure 5 shows the behavior of peo-
ple who keep the GPS on and the behavior of those who have no idea about
GPS availability over their devices. When considering the behavior of people
who keep the GPS on, we expected to have a rate close to 100%, but instead
only 77% of respondents claim to use location-aware applications, meaning
that one in five (21%) keep the GPS on, but do not use location-aware appli-
cations. When considering people who have no idea about GPS availability
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No Idea
2%
Never
11%No Idea
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25%
Fig. 5 Use of location-aware mobile applications by considering respondents with
GPS on (left) and respondents with “No idea” about GPS availability (right).
within their smartphones (Figure 5-right), 25% claim to use location-aware
applications and 64% continue to have no idea.
Although the location-aware scenario is its infancy stage, results show
that location-aware applications are quite popular. However, results also
show that people have a poor grasp of technologies/applications they use.
3.2 Twitter and Instagram Presence
The second main goal of the questionnaire was to understand how users
share their contents in social platforms. It is worth noting that we focused on
Twitter and on Instagram because, after an experimental investigation, we
observed that these platforms present a large volume of publicly accessible
data (no need to log-in, no need to be friend to see someone’s tweets/photos)
and provide valuable information to locate users.
Figure 6 reports data obtained by asking participants whether they have
a Twitter account. Men are more familiar with the micro-blogging platform
than women (72% vs. 57%) and among those who have a Twitter account,
48% of men and 32% of women actually use it, whereas 24% of men and
25% of women just registered to the platform but claim not to use it.
Yes
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28%
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43%
Yes
32%
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Fig. 6 Twitter presence: men (left) and women (right).
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Fig. 7 Instagram presence: men (left) and women (right).
Figure 7 presents the same investigation, but in the Instagram scenario.
It is to note that the majority of the respondents do not have an Insta-
gram account (54% of men and 61% of women). Probably, the reason is
that Instagram is a recent application and therefore it is not as popular as
Twitter. However, results show that men are more familiar with the mobile
photo-sharing platform than women (46% vs. 39%) and among those who
have an account, 37% of men and 26% of women actually use it.
Since both Twitter and Instagram may access to the location-aware tech-
nology available in the smartphone and may attach location information to
the produced contents, we investigated the penetration of these applications
among people who claim to use location-aware applications. Figure 8 shows
that both applications are popular among people who use location-aware
applications: 73% of them have a Twitter account and 59% of them have a
Instagram account. In particular, almost half of them regularly use Twitter
(48%) or Instagram (45%).
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Fig. 8 Twitter (left) and Instagram (right) presence by considering people who
use location-aware applications.
The presence in Twitter/Instagram can be different from person to per-
son since the platforms provide two different profiles: private or public. In
both platforms, the default setting is public (tweets/photos are visible to
anyone, whether or not they have an account) and, therefore, to protect
tweets/photos (visible only to approved friends) users have to change the
profile setting. To understand the way users share their contents, we inves-
tigated the type of profile they have on the two platforms.
Figure 9 reports results obtained while asking participants the profile
they use on Twitter. A considerable number of respondents (37% of men
and 51% of women) ignore the characteristics of their profile. The private
profile is selected by a minority of people: 28% of men and 24% of women.
Similar results can be observed in Figure 10, where we report results
obtained while asking participants the profile they have on the Instagram
platform: 59% of men and 68% of women have no idea about the nature
of their profile. Only 41% of men know their profile (13% of them opted
for a private profile); the percentage decreases to 32% when looking at the
women behavior (10% of them opted for a private profile).
The high percentage of people who have no idea about the nature of their
profile implies that they ignore who can access to their generated contents.
By considering that a considerable percentage of people opted for a public
profile, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of generated contents
are publicly available on the two platforms. Since Twitter and Instagram
may attach user’s geographical location to the generated contents, it is likely
that these contents may contain personal and sensitive data. To better un-
derstand this aspect, we ask participants if they use the geolocation feature
available in Twitter and in Instagram.
Figure 11 reports the use of the geolocation feature within Twitter. If the
percentage of people who do not use this feature is similar among men and
women (30% vs. 37%), there is a different behavior when analyzing people
who use this feature: 31% of men vs. 10% of women. Also, it is worth noting
the percentage of people who ignore the usage of this feature (39% of men
and 53% of women).
Figure 12 shows the use of the geolocation feature within Instagram.
With respect to Twitter, men are less familiar with this feature (59% of
them have no idea against the 39% of the Twitter users), but among the
ones who do have idea about the feature, 35% of them claim to use the
feature, and only 6% of them claim not to. A similar difference can be noted
Public
35%
No Idea
37%
Private
28%
No Idea
51%
Private
24%
Public
25%
Fig. 9 Twitter profile used by respondents: men (left) and women (right).
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Private
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68%
Private
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Public
22%
Fig. 10 Instagram profile used by respondents: men (left) and women (right).
when observing the women behavior: 66% (against the 53% of Twitter) have
no idea about the use of this feature, and 18% (against 10% measured in
the Twitter investigation) of them claim to use the geolocation feature.
Results highlight that the majority of respondents have no idea about the
available features and also highlight that only a minority of the respondents
claim not to use the geolocation feature. Furthermore, the obtained results
show that people tend to use this feature more when sharing photos than
when sharing tweets. By combining these results with the ones obtained
while investigating the Twitter and Instagram profile, it is very likely that
most of the users generated contents (textual or multimedia) are publicly
accessible and contain geographical information.
No Idea
39%
Yes
31%
No
30%
No Idea
53%
Yes
10%
No
37%
Fig. 11 Use of the geolocation feature on Twitter: men (left) and women (right).
To better understand the users’ behavior, we investigate if the geolo-
cation feature is used by people who claim to have selected the nature of
their profile either private or public. Figure 13 reports the percentage of
respondents who have a private profile and who claim to use the geoloca-
tion feature in Twitter (left) and Instagram (right). It can be observed that
even among users with a private profile, the use of the geolocation feature
is considerable (35% in Twitter and 43% in Instagram). Note the small
percentage of people who have no idea.
No Idea
59%
Yes
35%
No
6% No Idea66%
Yes
18%
No
16%
Fig. 12 Usage of the geolocation feature on Instagram: men (left) and women
(right).
Figure 14 reports the percentage of respondents who have a public profile
and who claim to use the geolocation feature in Twitter (left) and Insta-
gram (right). It is interesting to note that 83% of of the Instagram users
who selected their profile to public, claim to use the geolocation feature. It
looks like people want to attach the geographical information to their gen-
erated contents. In particular, when sharing photos, people tend to attach
geographical information to these contents.
No Idea
6%
Yes
35%
No
59%
Yes
43%No
57%
Fig. 13 Usage of the geolocation feature on Twitter (left) and Instagram (right)
by considering people with a private profile.
The above results show that people ignore the way they share their
generated contents and show that when they know, most of them attach the
geographical information to their generated contents. What about privacy?
Do people change privacy settings?
Figure 15 shows that people have no idea about privacy settings in
Twitter: most of them (54% of men and 66% of women) do not remem-
ber changing the default privacy settings. A minority changed the privacy
settings (22% of men and 16% of women) and the remaining did not (24%
of men and 18% of women). Figure 16 shows the similar behavior also in
the Instagram scenario.
Yes
36%No
64%
Yes
83%
No
17%
Fig. 14 Usage of the geolocation feature on Twitter (left) and Instagram (right)
by considering people with a public profile.
According to these results, people are not concerned about privacy: the
majority of them do not have idea about privacy settings and do not have
idea about the nature of their profile. Moreover, half of the people who
have idea about privacy settings or profile share their contents with every-
body and use the geolocation feature. Again, this means that most of the
users generated contents (textual or multimedia) are publicly accessible and
contain geographical information.
No Idea
54%
Yes
22%
No
24%
No Idea
66%
Yes
16%
No
18%
Fig. 15 Changes to privacy settings on Twitter: men (left) and women (right).
Among the ones who use the geolocation feature, we investigated the
reasons of using this feature. Figure 17 reports the main users’ motivations.
People use the geolocation feature for a personal reason (“To remind me
where I’ve been”): 51% in Instagram and 32% in Twitter. “To let others
find my photos” has been checked by 32% of Instagram users and 22% of
Twitter users. “To let my friends know where I am” is less popular: 14%
in Instagram and 16% in Twitter. It is interesting to note that among the
possible answers there was “To be contacted”. None of the respondents
checked this option.
No Idea
67%
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No
13%
No Idea
69%
Yes
13%
No
18%
Fig. 16 Changes to privacy settings on Instagram: men (left) and women (right).
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Fig. 17 Reasons to use the geo-localization feature on Twitter and Instagram.
3.3 Summary of Results
In this part of the investigation, we aimed at understanding if people are
aware of the characteristics of the devices and applications they use. Based
on the results we can say that a very large percentage of people own ad-
vanced devices, but have a lack of knowledge about the app scenario and
about the way they publish contents into social platforms, as they do not
know the type of profile they use and have no idea of privacy settings. Those
who have a better knowledge decide to attach geographical information to
their shared contents. Finally, among tweets and photos, people are more
willing disseminate and share photos. In summary, the first part of the in-
vestigation depicts the following scenario.
– Cellphone and connectivity. Smartphones with GPS technology are
widely available among participants and almost everyone is always con-
nected to the Internet through flat-rate data plans. Hence, technology is
not a burden for the development of an effective location-aware scenario;
– Use of location-aware applications. The majority of the respondents
claim to use location-aware mobile applications. In the near future this
percentage is likely to increase due to the ever increasing availability of
location-aware applications;
– Twitter and Instagram presence. The micro-blogging application is
more popular than Instagram, but in both platforms users have no idea
about the profile they use to publish their contents, nor they have about
the usage of the geolocation feature (i.e., they do not know whether the
application attaches user’s location to the generated contents or not).
This may represent a privacy risk for users;
– Use of the geolocation feature. Very personal reasons motivated
users to enable the geolocation feature: “To remind me where I’ve been”
is the main reason for using the geolocation feature, but other important
reasons are related to user’s friends (“To let others find my photos” and
“To let my friends know where I am”).
The high percentage of “don’t remember”, “don’t know”, “no idea”
shows that a location-aware scenario is still an obscure entity for most of
the users. To really understand users’ opinions and preferences of this novel
scenario, we think it is necessary to show them what third parties appli-
cations can do by browsing data in public social media platforms. To this
aim, in the next section, we present details of an application we developed
to create a location-aware scenario where users can be located in real-time
and where personal information can be collected from public social media
platforms. Once faced with the application, we will ask for users’ opinions
and preferences.
4 Location-aware scenario: an example
The real-world study presented in the previous section showed that people
are not really concerned about privacy and largely use geolocation technolo-
gies. In this section, we show how to develop a simple application able ex-
tract personal and sensitive users information from contents publicly avail-
able in Twitter and Instagram and able to use these information to locate,
in real-time, users on a map. Note that we focus our attention on the Twit-
ter and Instagram platforms for two main reasons: i) it is possible to browse
users’ generated contents without signing up for the service, and ii) both
platforms present a high volume of public data (no need to be friend to
see someone’s tweets or photos). Indeed, other applications, although pop-
ular like Foursquare and Facebook places, do not present a high volume of
public data. However, it is worth mentioning that the application may be
expanded to browse additional social media platforms if the corresponding
APIs are available.
We recall here that the goal is to show that advanced skills or advanced
technologies are not necessary and, therefore, anyone (your neighbor, your
friends, your son, your parents, etc.) can exploit social platforms APIs to
develop an application able to browse for geotagged contents and able to
retrieve personal and sensitive information from each geotagged content.
To be as simple as possible, the application is developed with the fol-
lowing constraints:
– Use of public data. No need to sign-up to the social platforms to ac-
cess to user’s generated contents and no need to install the developed
application on the users’ device;
– Use of real-time data. The application exploits contents ’just’ pub-
lished by users so as to have an actual picture of the investigated sce-
nario. Locating users in real-time can be very helpful in many scenarios,
from emergency situation to media marketing;
– Use of actual location. The application does not infer or compute any
user’s location, but it relies on the location available in the metadata
associated to user generated contents. Therefore, it is completely trans-
parent to the geolocation technology used (i.e., Twitter and Instagram
applications are in charge of attaching geo-coordinates to the user gen-
erated contents).
In the following, we present details of the application development and
of the application output.
Fig. 18 The architecture of the application designed to create a location-aware
scenario.
4.1 Application Development
The application is developed with Python 2.72 and, as depicted in Figure
18, is logically organized into four main blocks: i) Geocoding, ii) Tweets and
photos Retrieval, iii) Users Filtering, and iv) KML production.
Geocoding
This module converts an address provided in a textual form (street and city
2 Python Programming Language Official Website: http://www.python.org/
Description API Field
Geographical coordinatees coordinates
Creation time created at
ID id str
Number of times the Tweet has been retweeted retweet count
The actual text text
Author user
Table 1 Some of the fields associated to a single tweet.
name) into its GPS coordinates (latitude and longitude) so as to allow the
“Tweets and photos retrieval” module to look for contents produced in the
area. The application uses the geopy library3 to convert a textual address
(street name and city) into its GPS coordinates. For instance, by entering
our department address we have the following coordinates:
Viale Allegri 9, Reggio Emilia, Italy → (44.70304, 10.62957).
Tweets and photos retrieval
The application directly interacts with Twitter and Instagram platforms
through the platforms’ API45. In this way, it is possible to browse and ac-
cess to public data in their platforms. In addition to the user generated
contents, it is possible to access to the metadata associated to the content.
For instance, when accessing to a single tweet, it is possible to know the ge-
ographical location and the time the tweet has been written, the number of
times the tweet has been retweeted and the tweet author (see, Table 1). By
knowing the tweet author, it is possible to retrieve several personal user in-
formation: for instance, among the several information available, it is possi-
ble to know the account creation time, how the author describes him/herself,
the number of followers (and their names), the number of friends (and their
names), the preferred language, the author’s photo, etc. (see, Table 2). Sim-
ilarly, starting from an Instagram photo, it is possible to obtain several
information about the photo and about its author (see, Table 3 and Table
4).
Twitter and Instagram provide APIs that allow searching for tweets/photos
by specifying longitude and latitude. The APIs return the contents (in
JSON, JavaScript Object Notation format) generated by users located within
a given radius of the given geographical coordinates. For instance, if we want
to look for contents produced not more than 2 miles from our department,
the APIs require the triplet (44.70304, 10.62957, 2mi). The result is a list
of contents (tweets or photos) coupled with several personal and sensitive
information about the users who generated the contents.
3 http://code.google.com/p/geopy/
4 Twitter API: https://dev.twitter.com/
5 Instagram API: http://instagram.com/developer/
Description API Field
Account creation time created at
Account description description
Number of followers followers count
Number of followings friends count
User interface language lang
User location location
User name name
User screen name screen name
The user’s most recent tweet or retweet Status
The number of issued tweets (including retweets) user statuses count
Table 2 Some of the fields associated to a Twitter user.
Description API Field
Photo description media.caption
Hashtag media.tags
Number of received likes media.like count
Number of received comments media.comment count
Geographical coordinates location media.location.point
Photo publication time media.created time
Photo URL media.images.url
Table 3 Some of the fields associated to an Instagram photo.
Description API Field
Name media.user.full name
Nickname media.user.user name
ID media.user.id
Description Media.user.bio
URL Media.user.website
Table 4 Some of the fields associated to an Instagram user.
Users Filtering
The list of users produced by the previous module contains all the Twitter
and Instagram users that are located in a specific area and every user is de-
scribed with personal and sensitive information. The number of such users
may be very high (think of users located in Time Square, NYC) and may be
composed of users with very different characteristics (e.g., languages, num-
ber of followers, etc.). In addition to the no-filter option, this module allows
filtering users in four different ways: number of followers, user language,
number of generated contents, keyword within tweet or photo description.
Therefore, for a given area, it is possible to locate popular users (by filtering
them according to the number of followers), or users who speak a specific
language (by filtering them according to the language), or users who wrote
more tweets or shoot more photos (by filtering them according to the num-
ber of generated contents), or users who wrote tweets or described photos
with a particular keyword. In essence, the module selects a set of users (each
one described with personal and sensitive data) located in a specific area.
KML Production
To display the selected set of users on a map, we consider the KML (Key-
hole Markup Language) format [20], an international standard of the Open
Geospatial Consortium. This format is widely supported by the most com-
mon geospatial tools and web mapping services (e.g., Google Maps and
Google Earth). It is XML-based and is designed to attach visualization de-
tails and metadata to geo-reference media resources. Furthermore, it offers
a rich set of options to visualize objects within 2D and 3D maps.
Table 5 shows an example of a KML description. Every user located in
a specific area is described through the placemark tags. Every placemark is
associated to a specific geographical point (through the tags coordinates),
has a name (through the tag name) and may contain a description (through
the tag description) which is a generic container that can be filled with any
textual information. It is to note that KML supports the HTML-encoded
description within the description tag.
The module generates the KML file by describing every users selected
by the previous module within placemark tags: the GPS coordinates are
described through the coordinates tags and all the personal and sensitive
information are described in HTML format (for easier reading when dis-
played on a map) and inserted between <description>...</description>
tags.
4.2 Application Input/Output
The application is developed to show that anyone can exploit social plat-
forms APIs to develop a program able to browse for geotagged contents
(i.e., for contents generated in a specific neighborhood) and able to retrieve
personal and sensitive information from each geotagged contents. It has a
textual interface and requires: an address, the radius where to search for
users and the filtering options (see User Filtering Module). After receiving
these data, the application produces a KML file that can be visualized with
maps tools like Google maps and Google Earth.
Figure 19 shows how Google Earth displays KML file produced by the
developed application: all the users located in the specific area (Piazza Mag-
giore, Bologna, Italy) are described through yellow pins and when a specific
user is selected, the retrieved information about the user are displayed. Fig-
ure 20 shows an example of the personal information that can be collected
through public browsing of the Twitter/Instagram platform: in addition to
the user name and name account, it is possible to know the account creation
time (June 24, 2009), the interface language (English), the user picture, the
personal URL where to find additional and personal information, the user
description as written by the user, the usual location (Paris), the number
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<kml xmlns:gx="http://www.google.com/kml/ext/2.2"
xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
xmlns="http://www.opengis.net/kml/2.2">
<Folder>
<Placemark>
<name>USER NAME</name>
<description>GENERIC TEXTUAL DESCRIPTION</description>
<Point>
<coordinates>GEO COORDINATES</coordinates>
</Point>
</Placemark>
...
</Folder>
</kml>
Table 5 KML description: every user is described within a placemark.
of followers and the number following, the last written text and its creation
time.
By looking at these data, we can identify this user as a woman who
lives in Paris and works as a photographer and travelblogger. We also know
she is co-founder of a travel association, she has a considerable number of
followers and she follows a considerable number of people. Furthermore,
from her description we also know her Facebook account. Needless to say,
we also know she was in Galleria Cavour (a shopping center near Piazza
Maggiore square in Bologna) when we checked the area (on July 11, 2013).
Figure 21 shows the same output of Figure 19 but displayed with Google
Maps.
5 Location-aware scenario: opinions and preferences
In the previous section, we showed that a simple application may access
to personal and sensitive data without asking for permission and without
logging-in into the social platforms. Indeed, in an anonymous way, third
parties may browse social platforms and may retrieve users’ personal and
sensitive information. In the near future, it is likely that organizations and
industries will exploit public metadata with geolocation data to create ser-
vices we have not yet considered.
To investigate if users are aware of possible privacy and security risks
when using location-aware applications, we showed to the same participants
of Section 3 the location-aware scenario described in the previous section
and then we submitted them a questionnaire to understand their opinions
and preferences.
The first question was: “What would be your reaction if third parties
would access to your physical location through specific technologies without
Fig. 19 The set of users located in a specific area as displayed in Google Earth.
Every user is described with several personal information. Note that sensitive
personal information have been partially obscured for privacy reasons.
Fig. 20 Details of a user located in the area. Note that sensitive personal infor-
mation have been partially obscured for privacy reasons.
asking for your authorization?”. Answers were: “Discomfort”, “Indifferent”,
“Angry”, “I would think about personal benefits” and “I would think about
negative consequences”. Multiple checks were possible.
Figure 22 reports the obtained reactions when considering people who
claim to use location-aware applications and people who do not. We can ob-
Fig. 21 The set of users located in a specific area as displayed in Google maps.
Every user is described with several personal information. Note that sensitive
personal information have been partially obscured for privacy reasons.
serve that people who do not use location-aware applications (left) are more
worried than people who claim to use location-aware applications (right):
more “angry” answers (23% vs. 17% among men, and 47% vs. 20% among
women), more “discomfort” (54% vs. 28% among men, and 47% vs. 34%
among women) and more “think about negative consequences” (38% vs.
14% among men, and 63% vs. 37% among women).
The reactions show that people are not really aware of what can happen
when personal location is embedded into user generated contents shared in
public platforms. In particular, the analysis highlights that women are more
worried than men about the scenario. In general, results show that people
who use location-aware applications are less worried about third parties
accessing personal location.
To understand if there are different reactions among Twitter and Insta-
gram users, in the following we analyze users’ reactions according to per-
sonal profile (private, public or no idea) and to privacy settings (changed,
not changed or no idea).
Figure 23 reports the reactions of Twitter users. Results show that men
have similar reactions regardless of their profile type and of possible changes
to their privacy settings, whereas women behave differently. Women with a
private profile and women who changed their privacy settings think about
possible personal benefits. Likely, these women use privacy settings tools
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Fig. 22 Users’ opinion when asking: “What would be your reactions if third par-
ties would access to your physical location through specific technologies without
asking for your authorization?”. People who claim to use location-aware applica-
tions (left) and people who claim not to use location-aware applications (right).
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Fig. 23 Twitter users’ opinion when asking: “What would be your reactions if
third parties would access to your physical location through specific technologies
without asking for your authorization?”: men (a-c) and women (b-d).
to protect their contents and therefore they are not worried about third
parties accessing to their personal locations. Not being worried, they think
of possible benefits.
In particular, Figure 23 (a) we report men reactions according to per-
sonal profile: men with a private profile feel “discomfort” (33%) or “indif-
ference” (27%); reactions are similar for men with a public profile: “dis-
comfort” (37%) and “indifference” (37%); reactions are slightly different for
men who have no idea about their profile: “indifferent” (35%) and “think
about negative consequences” (25%). Figure 23 (b) reports women reactions
according to personal profile and shows that among women, users with a
private profile “think about negative consequences” or “personal benefits”
(37%); users with a public profile feel “discomfort” (41%) or “think about
negative consequences” (29%), and users who have no idea about their pro-
file “think about negative consequences” (40%) and feel “discomfort” (34%).
In Figure 23 (c) we report men reactions according to privacy settings: men
who changed privacy settings feel “discomfort” or are “indifferent” (33%);
men who did not change their privacy settings feel “discomfort” (46%) or
are “angry” (23%) and men who have no idea about changing their pri-
vacy settings are “indifferent” (65%). Among women (Figure 23 (d)), users
who changed privacy settings think about “personal benefits” (36%); users
who did not change privacy settings feel “discomfort” (42%) and users who
have no idea about changing their privacy settings “think about negative
consequences” (40%).
Figure 24 reports the reactions of Instagram users. Looking at the re-
sults, we observe that people (either men or women) are angry (or think
about negative consequences) if third parties would access to their photos,
regardless of profile type or privacy settings changes. It is interesting to note
that a considerable percentage of men with private or public profile and of
men who changed their privacy settings are “indifferent”; also, it is inter-
esting to observe that a considerable percentage of women with a public
profile think about personal benefits. With respect to the Twitter scenario,
reactions of Instagram users are more negative and settled. Likely, photos
are considered more personal than tweets and, therefore, if third parties ac-
cess to personal location through photos, users feel like an invasion of their
privacy.
In particular, Figure 24 (a) reports men’s reactions according to per-
sonal profile: men with a private profile are “angry” (43%), “indifferent”
(29%) or feel “discomfort” (29%); men with a public profile are “indiffer-
ent” (33%) and men who have no idea about their profile feel “discomfort”
(41%). Note that none of them think about personal benefits. Figure 24
(b) reports women’s reactions according to personal profile and shows that
among women, users with a private profile “think about negative conse-
quences” (57%) or are “angry” (43%); users with a public profile “think
about negative consequences” (47%), feel “discomfort” (33%) and think
about “personal benefits” (27%); users who have no idea about their profile
feel “discomfort” (39%) and “think of negative consequences” (30%). Fig-
ure 24 (c) reports men’s reactions according to privacy settings: men who
changed privacy settings are “indifferent” (45%) or “angry” (36%); men
who did not change their privacy settings feel “discomfort”, are “angry”
and “think about negative consequences” (29%); men who have no idea
about changing their privacy settings feel “discomfort” (40%). Figure 24
(d) reports women’s reactions according to privacy settings: among women,
users who changed privacy settings are “angry” (56%) or “think about neg-
ative consequences” (44%); users who did no change privacy settings “think
about negative consequences” (50%) and users who have no idea about
changing their privacy settings feel “discomfort” (38%) or “think about
negative consequences” (32%).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Private
Public
No Idea
Angry Negative? Benefits? Indifferent Discomfort 0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Private
Public
No Idea
Angry Negative? Benefits? Indifferent Discomfort
(a) (b)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Changed
Not changed
No Idea
Angry Negative? Benefits? Indifferent Discomfort 0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Changed
Not changed
No Idea
Angry Negative? Benefits? Indifferent Discomfort
(c) (d)
Fig. 24 Instagram users’ opinion when asking: “What would be your reactions if
third parties would access to your physical location through specific technologies
without asking for your authorization?”: men (a-c) and women (b-d).
The second question was: “Would you like to be contacted by third par-
ties according to the location of your tweets or photos?”. Possible options
were: “Yes”, “Yes, after my authorization”, “Yes, if messages are not numer-
ous”, “Yes, if I can receive benefits”, “Yes, but just for marketing reasons”,
“Yes, but not marketing reasons”, “Yes, If I can be of any help to someone
else” and “No”. Multiple choices were possible.
Figure 25 reports the obtained results when considering people who
claim to use location-aware applications and people who do not. The most
checked option was “No”, regardless users are familiar with location-aware
applications or not. However, the number of people who are willing to be
contacted is considerable, provided some constraints are met. In particular,
the authorization seems to be mandatory for people who use location-aware
applications and another important reason is to receive benefits (either per-
sonal or for someone else) from the service. According to these results, a
third-party service that requires authorization before accessing to personal
data and provides benefits may become popular among users.
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Fig. 25 Users’ opinion when asking: “Would you like to be contacted by third
parties according to the location of your tweets or photos?” People who claim to
use location-aware applications (left) and people who claim not to use location-
aware applications (right).
To understand if there are different opinions among Twitter and Insta-
gram users, in the following we analyze users’ opinions according to per-
sonal profile (private, public or no idea) and to privacy settings (changed,
not changed or no idea).
Figure 26 reports the opinions of the Twitter users. Results show that
people (either men or women) who ignore the nature of their profile re-
spond in a defensive manner and do not like to be contacted; conversely,
people who know their type of profile are more confident and would like to
enter the location-aware scenario provided some constraints are met: give
authorization and receive benefits.
In particular, Figure 26 (a) reports men’s opinions according to per-
sonal profile: men with private and public profile require third parties to
be authorized (47% and 32%, respectively); men with private profile think
also about personal benefits (27%) and benefits of others (33%). Conversely,
men with no idea about their profile do not like to be contacted by third
parties (40%). Figure 26 (b) reports women’s opinions according to per-
sonal profile: women with private profile do not like to be contacted (32%)
or require third parties to be authorized (32%); women with public profile
require third parties to be authorized (58%). Conversely, women with no
idea about the type of their profile do no like to be contacted (60%). Fig-
ure 26 (c) reports men reactions according to privacy settings: men who
changed their privacy settings do not like to be contacted (67%) or require
third parties to be authorized (38%). Men who did not change their privacy
settings require third parties to be authorized (39%). Similarly, men with no
idea privacy settings, require third parties to be authorized (39%). Figure
26 (d) reports women reactions according to privacy settings: women who
have no idea about modification to their privacy settings do not like to be
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Fig. 26 Twitter users’ opinion when asking: “Would you like to be contacted by
third parties according to the location of your tweets or photos?”: men (a-c) and
women (b-d).
contacted (58%); women are willing to be contacted if there is an autho-
rization process (58% of who did not change their privacy settings and 36%
of who changed their privacy settings).
Figure 27 reports the opinions of the Instagram users. Results show that
men who have no idea about their profile or about changing their privacy
settings do not like to be contacted or require third parties to be authorized;
similarly, men who have idea about their profile and men who changed their
privacy settings do not like to be contacted; however, they also think about
benefits (either personal or not) and would require authorization for third
parties. Women with a private profile and women who changed their privacy
settings do not like to be contacted. Likely, they changed their privacy
settings in order to protect their photos and not to be disturbed. Among
the ones who have no idea about their profile or set their profile as public,
provide authorization is an option for being contacted. With respect to the
Twitter scenario, people tend to be more protective. It looks like, photos
are more private than tweets. Women are willing to be contacted by third
parties when using Twitter, but when using Instagram they absolutely do
not want to be contacted. For men, it looks like the opposite: men who share
photos are more willing to be contacted than men who share tweets.
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Fig. 27 Instagram users’ opinion when asking: “Would you like to be contacted
by third parties according to the location of your tweets or photos?”: men (a-c)
and women (b-d)
In particular, Figure 27 (a) reports men’s opinions according to personal
profile: men who have a private profile are willing to be contacted provided
there are benefits, either personal or for others (43%). Similarly, men who
have a public profile are willing to be contacted if there is an authorization
process (33%), if there are personal benefits (33%) or if there are benefits for
someone else (27%). The situation is different when considering people who
have no idea about their profile: 34% do not like to be contacted and 38% are
willing provided third parties are authorized. Figure 27 (b) reports women’s
opinions according to personal profile: women who have no idea about their
profile do not like to be contacted (46%) and think about requiring third
parties to be authorized (39%); women who have a private profile do not
like to contacted (86%), and women who have a public profile do not like to
be contacted (40%) or think about personal benefits (33%). Figure 27 (c)
reports men reactions according to privacy settings: men who changed their
privacy settings do not like to be contacted (64%) or require third parties
to provide benefits (45%); men who did not change their privacy settings
require third parties to provide benefits (43%), to ask for an authorization
(29%), to provide benefits to someone else (29%), and men with no idea
about privacy settings, require third parties to be authorized (40%) or do not
like to be contacted (31%). Figure 27 (d) reports women reactions according
to privacy settings: women who changed their privacy settings do not like
to be contacted (78%); women who did not changed privacy settings do not
like to be contacted (50%) or require third parties to be authorized (33%),
and women who have no idea about changing their privacy settings do not
like to be contacted (43%) or require third parties to be authorized (38%).
Finally, we asked participants “How would you define a service able to
contact you according to the geographical area embedded in your tweets
or photos?”. Possible options were: “Advantageous”, “Alarming”, “Useful”,
“Negligible”, “Interesting”, “Intrusive”. Multiple choices were possible.
Figure 28 reports the obtained results when considering people who
claim to use location-aware applications and people who do not. In gen-
eral, there is no great difference between the two groups of people. The
number of people who define the service as “Intrusive” is greater among
the ones who do not use location-aware applications; similarly, the number
of people who define the service as “Interesting” is greater among the ones
who use location-aware applications. Another interesting difference regards
the “Alarming” adjective: women who use location-aware applications are
more worried than women who do not use such applications (20% vs. 9%).
Likely, women do not have a clear idea of what information a location-aware
application can publish over social platforms and once they realized what
it is possible to do (through the location-aware scenario showed in Section
4), they define the service as alarming.
To understand if there are different definitions among Twitter and Insta-
gram users, in the following we analyze users’ definitions according to per-
sonal profile (private, public or no idea) and to privacy settings (changed,
not changed or no idea).
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Fig. 28 Users’ opinion when asking: “How would you define a service able to
contact you according to the geographical area they specified in their tweets or
photos?” People who claim to use location-aware applications (left) and people
who claim not to use location-aware applications (right).
Figure 29 reports the definitions of the Twitter users. Men who know
their profile, as well as men who changed their privacy settings, define
the service as “Interesting”, otherwise the service is defined as “Intrusive”.
Women define the service as “Intrusive” regardless the type of profile they
have or the changes to privacy settings they made. When defining the ser-
vice, women are less interested and more alarmed than men.
In particular, in Figure 29 (a) we report men’s definitions according to
personal profile: men with private profile define the service as “Interesting”
(40%); 42% of men with a public profile define the service as “Intrusive”, but
the same percentage of people define the service as “Interesting”. Men who
have no idea about their personal profile define the service as “Intrusive”
(50%). Figure 29 (b) reports women’s definitions according to personal pro-
file: women define the service as “Intrusive” regardless of the type of profile
they have. Women with a private profile define the service as “Interesting”
(27%). Figure 29 (c) reports men’s definitions according to privacy settings:
among men who changed their privacy settings, the service is defined as
“Interesting (50%). Among the ones who did not change or did not remem-
ber changing privacy setting, the service is defined as “Intrusive” (54% and
38%, respectively). However, it is interesting to note that the “Interesting”
definition achieves considerable percentages among people who did not or
do not remember changing privacy settings. Figure 29 (d) reports women’s
definitions according to privacy settings: women define the service as “In-
trusive” regardless of wheter they changed privacy settings or not.
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Fig. 29 Twitter users’ opinion when asking: “How would you define a service
able to contact you according to the geographical area specified in your tweets?”:
men (a-c) and women (b-d).
Figure 30 reports the definitions of the Instagram users. Results show
that men define the service as “Intrusive” if they have no idea about privacy
settings or profile type, otherwise the service is defined as “Interesting”.
Among women, the service is defined as “Intrusive”.
In particular, Figure 30 (a) reports men’s definitions according to per-
sonal profile: men who have no idea about their profile define the service as
“Intrusive” (50%), the others define the service as “Interesting” (29% and
60% for the ones with private and public profile, respectively). Figure 30
(b) reports women’s definitions according to personal profile: women define
the service as “Intrusive” and only 29% of women with a private profile
define the service as “Interesting”. Figure 30 (c) reports men’s definitions
according to privacy settings: men who have no idea about privacy set-
tings define the service as “Intrusive” (46%), the others define the service
as “Interesting” (36% and 57% for the ones with private and public profile,
respectively) Figure 30 (d) reports women’s definitions according to privacy
settings: women define the service as “Intrusive” and only 25% of women
who did not change their privacy settings define the service as “Interesting”.
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Fig. 30 Instagram users’ opinion when asking: “How would you define a service
able to contact you according to the geographical area specified in your photos?”:
men (a-c) and women (b-d).
5.1 Summary of Results
The second part of the investigation aimed at understanding users’ opinions
and preferences about a location-aware scenario after seeing what a simple
application can do by browsing data publicly available in social platforms.
Results showed that people who were initially not concerned about privacy,
resulted to be the most worried about the location-aware scenario; con-
versely, people who were initially concerned resulted to be less worried about
the location-aware scenario and found the scenario interesting. Therefore,
the two-phase analysis showed that there is an implication between public
location information and users’ awareness: people who have no idea about
personal profile or privacy settings are not willing to enter into a location-
aware scenario as they define the service as “Intrusive”. Conversely, people
who do have idea about personal profile or privacy settings are willing to
enter into a location-aware scenario provided some constraints are met. In
particular, give authorization to third parties and receive benefits seem to
be the mandatory constraints to realize a location-aware scenario.
In summary, the second phase of the investigation depicts the following
scenario.
– Users’ reaction. Users of location-aware applications are less worried
than those who do not use location-aware applications. Women seem
to be more worried than men. When talking about photo the “angry”
reaction is predominant.
– Users’ will to be contacted. People do not like to be contacted, but if
the service asks for their authorization and if it provides benefits, users
are willing to be contacted.
– User’s opinions. Men find the service “Interesting”, whereas women
find it “Intrusive”.
Although the majority of the participants negatively defined the service,
several positive opinions were checked. If on the one side users are worried
about the usage of public data to locate and contact them, on the other
side they did not have preconceived ideas about a location-aware scenario.
Indeed, according to the obtained results, users are willing to enter into a
location-aware scenario if there are clear rules and benefits.
6 Guidelines for developing an effective location-aware scenario
Results showed that technology is not a burden for the development of
an effective location-aware scenario, but also highlighted that users are not
completely aware of what happens in the mobile scenario when producing or
sharing contents. Furthermore, results also showed that, after showing users
the amount of personal and sensitive data that can be extracted from con-
tents publicly available in social platforms, the majority of people thought
about possible negative consequences and, in general, the concerns about
privacy have grown. Needless to say, these concerns may hinder the success
of the location-aware scenario. In the following, we propose some guidelines
for both users and developers/enterprises that might be helpful in develop-
ing an effective location-aware scenario.
From the developers/enterprises point of view, a successful location-
aware scenario will provide a better knowledge of their customers (e.g, urban
movements, timetable, etc), will provide users with a better service (e.g.,
developed according to users’ habits), will allow designing more efficient
advertising campaign (e.g., place advertising signs in areas highly frequented
by potential customers), will provide customization services (e.g., video on
demand according to users’ location) and will introduce novel services (e.g.,
the use of geo-reference data combined with the Internet may facilitate the
success of the augmented reality.) However, to build an effective location-
aware scenario, developers/enterprises should be aware that users do not
want to be bothered for marketing or advertisement reasons. Instead, users
are willing to enter into a location-aware scenario if services will ask for their
authorization before accessing to their personal data and if they provide
benefits to them. Developers/enterprises should also be aware that users
consider photos a more private resource than tweets. Moreover, since in
current OSs, the process of enabling/disabling the geolocation technologies
is not straightforward, the developed application should aware users when
they are sharing contents with personal data hidden in the shared resource.
Similarly to the message that pops-up the first time the device tries to
go on-line (“Continuing Internet access will lead to traffic. Continue?”),
applications should aware users of what personal data are going to be shared
in social platforms. For instance, a message like “The photo you are sharing
allows third parties to locate you” allowing users to select between two
possible options “Remove geolocation info” or “Continue” would be very
informative for the users.
From the user point of view, a successful location-aware scenario will fa-
cilitate many aspects of their lives, but it will also represent a risk for their
privacy. Technology can help to protect users’ privacy, but users have a key
role in protecting their data. For this reason, users should be aware of the
technologies available in their device and should know advantages and dis-
advantages of using these technologies; should know how to enable/disable
specific services and/or technologies, should be aware of what data the in-
stalled applications have access to, should be aware that multimedia content
(either photos or videos) are usually coupled with a lot of personal and sen-
sitive information, and, needless to say, they should know what data are
fundamental/critical for the applications.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated attitudes, behaviors and opinions of users
with respect to the location-aware scenario. The investigation was done
in two phases: the first phase aimed at understanding what people know
or ignore of a location-aware scenario and the second phase investigated
users’ opinions after showing them the amount of personal and sensitive
information that a simple application can access to by browsing contents
publicly available in social media platforms.
Results showed that people who are not initially concerned about pri-
vacy are the most worried about the location-aware scenario; conversely,
people who were initially concerned, are less worried about the location-
aware scenario and find the scenario interesting. Results also showed that
men are more willing than women to enter the location-aware scenario, but
both require to give authorization and to receive benefits when third parties
access to their contents. Other interesting findings were that users do not
want to be bothered with marketing or advertising services, that women are
very alarmed if third parties would access to their photos and that photos
are considered as a personal resource that need to be protected from third
parties access.
The analysis of the obtained results allowed us to outline possible guide-
lines that we think might be helpful for both users and developers/enterprises
to build an effective location-aware scenario.
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